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[Crim. No. 5672. In Bank. Oct. 4, 1955.] 
In re TROY CLIFFORD HESS on Habeas Corpus. 
[1] Criminal Law-Pormer Jeopardy-Identity of Offenses.-The 
offense of contributing to the delinquency of a minor is not 
necessarily included in the offense of rape, since rape of the 
kinds described in Pen. Code, § 261, subds. 2-6, can be com-
mitted on a woman 21 years of age or more. 
[2] Id.-Pormer Jeopardy-Identity of Offenses.-Under Pen. 
Code, § 654, relating to acts made punishable in different ways 
by different provisions of such code, double punishment for 
rape would be improper regardless of whether there is but one 
offense or six different offenses of rape. 
[S] Id.-Pormer Jeopardy-Identity of Offenses.-Where an of-
fense cannot be committed without necessarily committing 
another offense, the latter is a necessarily included offense. 
[4] Id.-Pormer Jeopardy-Identity of Offenses.-Since forcible 
rape (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. 3) can be committed without 
eontributing to the delinquency of a minor, the offense of 
contributing to the delinquency of a minor is not necessarily 
included in forcible rape. 
[6] Indictment and Information-Oharging Offense-Necessity.-A. 
person cannot be convicted of an offense (other than a neces-
sarily included offense) not charged against him by indictment 
or information, whether or not there was evidence at his trial 
to show that he had committed that offense. 
[6] Id.-Oharging Offense-Necessity.-Due process of law re-
quires that an accused be advised of the charges against him 
in order that he may have a reasonable opportunity to prepare 
and present his defense and not be taken by surprise by 
evidence offered at his trial. 
['1&. 7b] Habeas Oorpus-Grounds-Defective Accusatory Pleading. 
-Where it appears from the judgment roll that the offense of 
eontributing to the delinquency of a minor was not charged 
against defendant in the information, that such offense is not 
necessarily included in the offense of forcible rape that was 
chargcd therein, and that the trial court therefore actcd in 
excess of its jurisdiction in entering a judgment of conviction 
of that offense against defendant, his imprisonment under that 
[1] See Oal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 179 et seq.; Am.Jur., Crimil;tal 
Law, §§ 386, 388. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-4] Criminal Law, § 144; [5, 6J Indiet-
ment and Information, § 22; [7] Habeas Corpus, § 22(2); [8] 
Habeas Corpus, §§ 61,65; [9] Criminal Law, § 111. 
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judgment is unlawful and he is entitled to be discharged on 
hahea!) corpus. 
[8] ld.-Hearing-Presumptions: Discharge and Remand.-Where 
defendant was charged with and tried for forcible rape but 
was convicted of contributing to the delinquency of a minor, 
• it mus~ be presumed on habeas corpus that the jury concluded 
that he was not guilty of forcible rape before they considered 
whether he should be convicted of what they erroneously 
believed to be a lesser included offense, and accordingly, by 
finding him guilty of contributing to the delinquency of a 
minor, being in the terms of the verdict "a lesser offense 
included in the offense charged in the information," the jury 
acquitted defendant of the offense charged, and with respect 
to that charge he is entitled to his release and need not be 
remanded to the custody of the sheriff of the county in which 
he was tried. (Overruling People v. Ourtis, 76 Cal. 57, 11 
P. 541, which held such a verdict was a nullity for all purposes.) 
[9] Criminal Law-Former Jeopardy-Waiver.-Where a defend-
ant charged with forcible rape was improperly found guilty 
of the unpleaded offense of contributing to the delinquency 
of a minor, but he failed to object to the entry of judgment 
on the defective verdict and collaterally attacked the judg-
ment in a habeas corpus proceeding, he impliedly waived any 
objection to being retried on the unpleaded charge j and neither 
the granting of habeas corpus nor the improper conviction 
would prevent his being properly charged and tried for the 
unpleaded offense, even if he had been in jeopardy with respect 
to that offense. 
PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from 
custody. Writ granted. 
Bruce A. Werlhof and Robert W. Trimble for Petitioner. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn, 
Chief Assistant Attorney General, and Raymond M. Mom-
boisse, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-In April 1954, petitioner, who was then 
17 years of age, was charged by an information with "the 
crime of RAPE, a felony, in violation of Section 261, sub-
division 3, of the Penal Code of the State of California 
(Forcible), committed as follows: 
"The said 'rROY CLII~FOHD lIESS, on or about the 11th day 
of April A.D. 1954, in the said County of EI Dorado, in the 
said. State of California, aud before th~ tiling of this informa-
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tion, dld then and there ,villfully, unlawfully, feloniously, 
and with force and violence, have and accomplish an act of 
sexua1 illtcJ:,course with and upon . . . ., a female person, 
who was not then and there the wife of the said defendant, 
Troy Clifford Hess, without the consent and against the will 
of the said •.•. , and she, the said . . . ., then and there 
resisted the accomplishment of said act of sexual intercourse, 
but her resistance was then and there overcome by force and 
violence used upon and against the said . . . ., by said de-
fendant, Troy Clifford Hess." (Name of alleged victim 
deleted.) 
The jury returned a verdict finding petitioner guilty of 
contributing to the delinquency of a minor. (WeIf. & Inst. 
Code, § 702.) A judgment of conviction was entered on the 
verdict, and petitioner was committed to the Youth Authority 
for the time prescribed by law. He did not appeal and the 
judgment became final. He now seeks his discharge on habeas 
corpus. 
Petitioner contends that he was acquitted of the charge 
of forcible rape, that contributing to the delinquency of a 
minor is not an offense necessarily included in the crime 
of rape, and that the court therefore acted in excess of its 
jurisdiction in entering a Judgment of conviction of that 
offense against him. 
[1] In support of his contention that defendant's convic-
tion of contributing to the delinquency of a minor was proper 
on the ground that that offense is necessarily included in the 
offense with which he was charged, respondent makes the 
following argument: (1) there is but one crime of rape, and 
the six subdivisions of section 261 of the Penal Code merely 
state six different ways of committing the same crime. (People 
v. Oraig, 17 Cal.2d 453,455 [110 P.2d 403]) ; (2) contributing 
to the delinquency of a minor is necessarily included in a 
charge of statutory rape (PeopZe v. Greer, 30 Ca1.2d 589, 596 
[184 P.2d 512]); (3) therefore, contributing to the delin-
quency of a minor is necessarily included in the crime of rape, 
regardless of which of the subdivisions of section 261 defendant 
is alleged to have violated. This argument is internally in-
consistent and self-destructive. If all of the definitions of 
rape must be considered in determining hat are necessarily 
included offenses, the conclusion is inescapable that contrib-
uting to the delinquency of a minor is not a necessarily 
included offense since rape of the kinds described in sub-
divisions 2-6 of section 261 could be committed on a woman 
) 
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21 years of age or more. Thus, to accept respondent's argu-
ment would create an inconsistency with a series of cases 
(People v. Greer, supra, 30 Ca1.2d 589, 597-598 and cases 
cited; People v. Chapman, 81 Cal.App.2d 857, 863-866 [185 
P.~d 424]) holding that contributing to the delinquency of a 
minor is necessarily included in statutory rape, for those 
cases are based on the premise that statutory rape is a special 
kind of rape and that every commission of that offense will 
contribute to the delinquency of a minor. 
Nor are the holdings in those cases inconsistent with the 
holding in In re Craig, supra, 17 Ca1.2d 453. In that case 
it was held that the defendant could not be convicted on two 
counts merely because he committed a forcible rape on a 
victim under 18 years of age. Although it was stated in the 
Craig case that the six subdivisions of section 261 of the 
Penal Code" merely define the circumstances under which an 
act of intercourse may be deemed an act of rape; they are 
not to be construed as creating several offenses of rape based 
upon that single act' 1 (17 Ca1.2d at 455), that statement must 
be read in light of the problem then before the court, that 
is, whether the defendant could be doubly punished for a 
single act. [2] Under section 654 of the Penal Code it is 
clear that double punishment would be improper (In re 
Chapman, 43 Ca1.2d 385, 389-390 [273 P.2d 817]; People v. 
Knowles, 35 Ca1.2d 175, 187-189 [217 P.2d 1]; People v. 
Slobodion, 31 Ca1.2d 555, 561-563 [191 P .2d 1]), regardless 
of whether there is but one offense or six different offenses of 
rape. 
Section 1159 of the Penal Code provides that "The jury 
may find the defendant guilty of any offense, the commission 
of which is necessarily included in that with which he is 
charged .... " [3] "The test in this state of a necessarily 
included offense is simply that where an offense cannot be 
committed without necessarily committing another offense. 
the latter is a necessarily included offense." (People v. Greer, 
30 Ca1.2d 589, 596 [184 P.2d 512J ; see also People v. Kehoe, 
33 Ca1.2d 711, 713 [204 P.2d 321].) [4] Forcible rape 
(Pen. Code, § 261, subd. 3), can be committed without con-
tributing to the delinquency of a minor, e. g., forcible rape 
of a woman 21 years of age or more. The latter offense, 
therefore, is not necessarily included in the former. (People v. 
Kennedy, 133 Cal.App.2d 693, 694 [284 P.2d 898].) 
[5] A person cannot be convicted of an offense (other than 
a necessarily included offense) not charged against him by 
) 
) 
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indictment or information, whether or not there was evidence 
at his trial to show that he had committed that offense. 
(People v. Sm·ith, 136 Cal. 207,&208 [68 P. 702] ; People v. 
Arnett, 126 Cal. 680, 681 [59 P. 204]; People v. Wallace, 
9 Cal. 30, 32; In re Oolford, 68 Cal.App. 308, 311 [229 P. 63] ; 
People v. Arnarez, 68 Cal.App. 645, 648, 651 [230 P. 193] ; 
People v. Akens, 25 Cal.App. 373, 376 [143 P. 795] ; see also 
People v. Mahony, 145 Cal. 104, 107-109 [78 P. 354]; Pen. 
Code, §§ 950, subd. 2, 1159, 1426.) The information charging 
forcible rape in the present case did not advise petitioner that 
he must be prepared to controvert evidence that his alleged 
victim was under the age of 21 years and to defend a charge 
of having committed an act that would tend "to cause or 
encourage any person under the age of 21 years" to become 
a delinquent. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 702; see also People v. 
Lamanuzzi,77 Cal.App. 301, 303-304 [246 P. 557] ; People v. 
Salisbury, 59 Cal.App. 299, 300-301 [210 P. 642] ; People v. 
Akens, supra, 25 Cal.App. 373, 374-375.) [6] Due process 
of law requires that an accused be advised of the charges 
against him in order that he may have a reasonable oppor-
tunity to prepare and present his defense and not be taken 
by surprise by evidence offered at his trial. (In re Oliver, 
333 U.S. 257, 273 [68 8.Ct. 499, 92 L.Ed. 682]; Oooke v. 
United States, 267 U.S. 517, 536-537 [45 8. Ct. 390, 69 L.Ed. 
767] ; In re Digiuro, 100 Cal.App.2d 260, 261 [223 P.2d 263]; 
see also People v. Robinson, 107 Cal.App. 211, 217 [290 P. 
470] .) 
[7aJ Since it appears from the judgment roll (cf. In re 
Bell, 19 Cal.2d 488, 500-505 [122 P.2d 22]) that the offense 
of contributing to the delinqu~ncy of a minor was not charged 
against petitioner in the information, that it is not necessarily 
included in the offense that was charged therein, and that 
the court therefore acted in excess of its jurisdiction in enter-
ing a judgment of conviction of that offense against him, his 
imprisonment under that judgment of conviction is unlawful. 
[8] It is contended, however, that petitioner is not entitled 
to be discharged but must be remanded to the custody of the 
sheriff of the county in which he was tried since the warrant 
under which he was held by that sheriff has not been super-
seded by a valid judgment of conviction or acquittal. (In·re 
McOoy, 32 Cal.2d 73, 77 [194 P.2d 531].) Had the offense 
of contributing to the delinquency of a minor been an offense 
necessarily included in the offense charged, the verdict finding 
petitioner guilty of the former offense would have constituted 
) 
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an acquittal of the latter. (People v. Greer, 30 Cal.2d 589, 598 
[184 P.2d 512], and cases cited.) Moreover, in such a case, 
by attacking the validity of the conviction for the lesser offense, 
petitioner would not waive his right to rely on that acquittal 
a~ a binding adjudication that he was not guilty of the greater 
offense charged. (People v. Gordon, 99 Cal. 227, 229-232 [33 
P. 901] ; People v. McFarlane, ·138 Cal. 481, 486 [71 P. 568, 
72 P. 48, 61 L.R.A. 245] ; People v. Smith, 134 Cal. 453, 455 
[66 P. 669]; People v. Apgar, 35 Cal. 389, 391; People v. 
Gilmore, 4 Cal. 376, 377 [60 Am.Dec. 620].) This rule is 
based on the theory that the jury, by returning a verdict of 
guilty of the lesser offense returns an implied verdict of not 
guilty of the greater offense, and that any error affecting the 
express verdict of guilty does not affect the conclusiveness of 
the implied verdict of acquittal. (People v. Gordon, supra; 
People v. Gilmore, supra.) The theory of these cases is equally 
applicable in the present case. Petitioner was charged with 
and tried for the crime of forcible rape, and it must be 
presumed that the jury concluded that he was not guilty of 
that offense before they considered whether he should be 
convicted of what they erroneously believed to be a lesser 
included offense. Accordingly, by finding defendant guilty 
of contributing to the delinquency of a minor, being in the 
terms of the verdict, "a lesser offense included in the offense 
charged in the information," the jury acquitted defendant of 
the offense charged, and with respect to that charge he is 
entitled to his release. People v. Ourtis, 76 Cal. 57 [17 P. 
941], which held that a verdiet of guilty of an offense neither 
charged nor included in t11e offense charged in the information 
was a nullity for all purposes, is inconsistent with the reason-
ing of the cases cited above and is overruled. 
[9] Finally it should be noted that neither the granting 
of the writ in this case nor petitioner's invalid conviction 
of contributing to the delinquency of a minor will prevent 
his being properly charged with and tried for that offense. 
Even if it is assumed that he has been in jeopardy with 
respect to such contributing, despite the failure of the infor-
mation to charge that offense or one in which it was included, 
by failing to object to the entry of judgment on the defective 
yerdict and by collaterally attacking the judgment in this 
proceeding petitioner has impliedly waived any objection to 
being retried on the charge of which he was improperly con-
victed. (People v. llam Tong, 155 Cal. 579, 581-584 [102 
P. 263, 132 Am.St.Hep. 110, 24 L.R.A.N.S. 481]; People v. 
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Travers, 73 Cal. 580, 582 [15 P. 293] ; People v. Murat, 45 
Cal. 281, 285; People v. Kelly, 132 Cal.App. 118, 122 [22 P.2d 
526] ; People v. Sachau, 78 Cal.App. 702, 705-709 [248 P. 
960] ; In re Colford, supra, 68 Cal.App. 308, 311-312; In re 
Davis, 68 Cal.App. 801 [229 P. 1114] ; In re Evans, 68 Cal. 
App.802 [229 P.1114].) 
[7b] The writ of habeas corpus is granted, the return to 
the order to show cause shall stand as the return to the writ, 
the petitioner is discharged, and his bail is exonerated. 
Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., and Spenee, J., 
eoncurred. 
EDMONDS, J.-In People v. Greer, 30 Cal.2d 589 [184 
P.2d 512], the defendant had been tried upon separate charges 
of contributing to the delinquency of a minor (WeIf. & Inst. 
Code, § 702) and "violations of Penal Code, sections 261(1) 
(statutory rape) and 288 (lewd and lascivious conduct)." He 
was convicted of contributing to delinquency but the jurors 
disagreed as to the other offenses. In the second trial, he 
pleaded double jeopardy as a bar to further prosecution 
upon the charges as to which the former jury had disagreed. 
This court reversed a judgment of conviction for failure of 
the trial court to allow proof of the former prosecution. "It 
is true," said the court, "that each offense is stated differently 
in the codes and that defendant could have contributed to the 
delinquency of a minor without committing statutory rape or 
a lewd and lascivious act. (Citation.) Nevertheless, the con-
verse is not true. We are holding, not that these offenses are 
identical, but that every violation of sections 261 (1) and 288 
necessarily constitutes a violation of section 702 and that 
therefore the offense defined in section 702 is an offense neces-
sarily included in the offenses defined in sections 261(1) and 
288." (30 Cal.2d p. 598.) 
In effect, if not explicitly, the Greer case holds that statutory 
rape, as defined in section 261, subd. 1, of the Penal Code 
is a specific offense of which one may be convicted. No other 
conclusion would support the result reached, because the 
offense of contributing to the delinquency of a minor would 
not necessarily be established by proof of conduct which wpuld 
support a conviction of rape under the circumstances enumer-
ated in the other subsections of section 261. However, in 
People v. Craig, 17 Ca1.2d 453 [110 P.2d 403], this court held 
that section 261 specifies only one criminal offense which may 
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be committed under the different circumstances enumerated 
in the subsections. 
Upon this analysis of section 261, Craig's conviction of two 
counts of rape was reversed as to one of them because both 
were based upon the one act of forcible intercourse committed 
with a 16-year-old girl. The court said: "Under this section 
[Pen. Code, § 261], but one punishable offense of rape results 
from a single act of intercourse, although that act may be 
accomplished under more than one of the conditions or circum-
stances specified in the foregoing subdivisions. These sub-
divisions merely define the circumstances under which an act 
of intercourse may be deemed an act of rape; they are not 
to be construed as creating several offenses of rape based 
upon that single act." (P. 455.) Quoting from People v. 
Venable, 25 Cal.App.2d 73 [76 P.2d 523], the court stated 
the test for determining "whether one or more offenses result 
from a single act or transaction," as being" 'the identity of 
tke offenses as distinguished from the identity of the trans-
actions from which they arise. A defendant may be convicted 
of two separate offenses arising out of the same transaction 
when each offense is stated in a separate count and when the 
two offenses differ in their necessary elements and one is 
not included within the other. " (P.457.) 
In the Craig case, the court rejected the argument that four 
separate offenses are specified by section 261 and distinguished 
cases in which convictions for two or more offenses arising 
out of the same act were upheld. "In the cited instances, 
the one act or transaction either injured or affected two or 
more victims or ran counter to two or more separate and dis-
tinct statutes defining different crimes with different elements. 
In many instances the violation of these separate statutes was 
complete at different stages of commission of the single act or 
transaction. . . . But none of the foregoing distinguishable 
characteristics is here present. There is only one victim. 
There has been a violation of but one statute-section 261 of 
the Penal Code. And, while the proof necessarily varies with 
respect to the several subdivisions of that section under which 
the charge may be brought, the sole punishable offense under 
any and all of them is the unlawful intercourse with the 
victim. " (P. 458.) 
Certaiuly, rape committed upon an adult bas nothing what-
ever to do with contributing to the delinquency of a minor, 
and one is not giVPll adeqnate llotice of the possibility of being 
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charges forcible rape. For that reason, I concur in the 
judgment. However, in my opinion, the distinction drawn by 
the majority between the Craig and Greer cases does not 
fully resolve the apparent conflict between those two decisions. 
Although they were decided on different factual bases, they 
state conflicting definitions of the offense of rape. The defi-
nition of an offense is important both to the state and to the 
accused, and conflicts in definition should be eliminated. 
SHENK, J .-1 dissent. 
The petitioner was charged with forcible rape as de-
nounced by subdivision 3 of section 261 of the Penal Code. 
Upon his plea of not guilty the cause went to trial before 
a jury. As revealed by the record, the petitioner stated 
that he, with the prosecuting witness and some other young 
people, parked their car near the side of a mountain road 
in El Dorado County; that he was left alone in the car with 
the prosecuting witness and that they moved into the back 
seat of the car; that" necking" and "fondling" were engaged 
in willingly by the girl, culminating in a voluntary act of 
sexual intercourse. The prosecuting witness stated that she 
entered the back seat willingly, but immediately remonstrated 
with the petitioner to discontinue his advances; that instead 
of following her request he became more brutal and aggres-
sive, bruising her neck, face, ribs, and forcibly consummating 
an act of intercourse. 
The trial court instructed the jury that contributing to 
the delinquency of a minor as denounced by section 702 of 
the Welfare and Institutions Code was a crime included 
within the offense charged in the information. The evidence 
was sufficient to support a conviction of forcible rape as 
charged; but the jury, obviously choosing to relieve the peti-
tioner of the more serious charge, found him c, guilty of 
contributing to the delinquency of a minor in violation of 
section 702 of the Welfare and Institutions Code of the State 
of California, being a lesser offense included in the offense 
charged in the information." 
Under the law of this state the trial court was justified in 
so instructing the jury, and in turn it was within the province 
of the jury to follow those instructions and return the veldict 
in the form quoted. It is only by specious reasoning and 
overruling former cases in this state on the subject that the 
majority has ordered the release of the petitioner. 
Section 702 of the Welfare and Institutions (J(,(b provides 
) 
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that any person who commits an act which causes or tends 
to cause or encourage any person under the age of 21 years 
to come within the provisions of any of the subdivisions of 
section 700 is guilty of a misdemeanor. Subdivision k of 
section 700 includes anyone "who is leading, or from any 
cd.use is in danger of leading, an idle, dissolute, lewd, or 
immoral life." A voluntary act of sexual intercourse with 
a female under the age of 21 years is unquestionably sufficient 
to bring the petitioner within section 702. (See People v. 
Greer, 30 Ca1.2d 589 [184 P.2d 512] ; People v. Young, 44 
Cal.App. 279 [186 P. 383] ; People v. Oamp, 42 Cal.App. 411 
[183 P. 845]; 15 Cal.Jur.2d, Delinquent Children, § 29.) 
The question then is whether the offense against a female 
under the age of 21 years is a crime included within the crime 
of rape as denounced in section 261 of the Penal Code. 
Penal Code, section 1159, as amended in 1951 provides that 
"The jury, or the judge if a jury is waived, may find the 
defendant guilty of any offense, the commission of which is 
necessarily included in that with which he is charged. . .. " 
In People v. Greer, supra, 30 Ca1.2d 589, at page 596, it was 
said by Mr. Justice Traynor for an unanimous court that 
"The test in this state of a necessarily included offense is 
simply that where an offense cannot be committed without 
necessarily committillg another offense, the latter is a neces-
sarily incI uded offense." The majority view of the present 
case stands or falls on the statement in the opinion that 
"Forcible rape (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. 3) can be committed 
without contributing to the delinquency of a minor, e.g., 
forcible rape of a woman 21 years of age or more." That 
statement is obviously correct as it stands, but it is not re-
sponsive to the issue. It incorrectly assumes that there is a 
distinct crime of forcible rape separable from the other situa-
tions enumerated in section 261 describing the crime of 
"rape. " 
Under section 261 there is but one crime of rape although 
the condemned act may be committed under any of the various 
conditions specified ill the several subdivisions of the section. 
In People v. Cra'ig, 17 Ca1.2d 453 [110 P.2d 403], it was said 
at page 455: "These subdivisions merely define the circum-
stances under which an act of intercourse may be deemed an 
act of rape; they are not to be construed as creating several 
offenses of rape based upon that single act." The essential 
guilt of rape consists in the outrage to the per~on of the 
female. (Pen. Code, § 263.) lIenee the rule was COl'rectIy 
) 
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stated in People v. Snyder, 75 Cal. 323 at pages 324-325 [17 
P. 208]: "We think the true construction of section 261 
to be that thereby the legislature ~eant merely to put beyond 
doubt the rule that on an information for rape the things 
mentioned in the subdivisions could be proven, and would 
establish the crime. It is not intended to alter or establish 
a rule of pleading; or to create six different kinds of crime. 
Now, as before the adoption of the code, under an indictment 
similar to the information in this case, any of the matters 
mentioned in section 261 may be proved. They are included 
in the words 'by force and violence, and against her will,' 
and 'did feloniously ravish.' •• ." (See People v. Oraig, 
supra, 17 Ca1.2d 453; People v. Jailles, 146 Cal. 301 [79 P. 
965] ; People v. Vann, 129 Cal. 118 [61 P. 776].) Guided by 
these consistently followed principles, our courts have held 
that evidence tending to show a violation of subdivision 4 
where the female is prevented from resisting by threats of 
harm or administration of narcotics, is admissible to support 
an allegation and conviction under subdivision 3, where the 
female resists but her resistance is overcome by force or 
violence. (People v. Snyder, supra, 75 Cal. 323; People v. 
Tollack, 105 Cal.App.2d 169 [233 P.2d 121] ; People v. Blan-
kenship, 103 Cal.App.2d 60 [228 P.2d 835] ; People v. Oas-
sandras, 83 Cal.App.2d 272 [188 P.2d 546]); and that evi-
dence tending to show a violation of subdivision 3 is admissible 
to support an allegation and conviction under subdivision 2 
where the female is incapable, through lunacy or other un-
soundness of mind of giving legal consent. (People v. Boggs, 
107 Cal.App. 492 [290 P. 618].) In People v. Jailles, supra, 
146 Cal. 301, the foregoing principles were applied to the 
problem here involved. There it is stated that an allegation 
of forcible rape under subdivision 3 is sufficient to support a 
conviction on evidence showing a violation of section 261, 
subdivision 1, voluntary intercourse where the female is under 
the statutory age. (See also People v. Vann, supra, 129 
Cal. 118.) 
In the foregoing cases the allegation in the information of 
a specific subdivision of the code seems at most to indicate 
only the prosecutor's initial theory of the case. By no means 
is the court or jury bound to remain within the bounds of 
that theory as stated. For the purpose of determining ques-
tions of adequate notice and included offenses, an information 
charging the violation of a particular subdivision of section 
261 must be deemed to charge the general crime of rape as 
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defined in its various circumstances stated in that section 
as a whole. Since in the present case the petitioner was 
eharged with violating section 261, subdivision 3, he was sub-
ject to conviction of rape under section 261, subdivision 1, 
involving voluntary intercourse with female under the statu-
tbryage. (People v. Jailles, supra, 146 Cal. 301.) 
When the petitioner's liability is comprehended within 
subdivision 1, it is clear that the majority view in the present 
ease is directly contrary to the opinion of this eourt in People 
v. Greer, supra, 30 Ca1.2d 589. In that case it was necessary 
to determine whether a section 702 violation was included 
within section 261, subdivision 1, for double jeopardy pur-
poses. Greer had been previously convicted of violating see-
tion 702. Upon his subsequent eonviction of rape under 
seetion 261, subdivision 1, this court reversed, holding that 
the offense stated in section 702 was an offense necessarily 
included within section 261. subdivision 1. In reaching that 
result it was stated at pages 597-598: "Statutory rape 
(§ 261 (1» and lewd and lascivious conduct (§ 288) are 
offenses against minors under 18 and 14 years of age, re-
spectively, whereas section 702 protects minors under 21. 
Consequently, the age groups covered by sections 261(1) 
and 288 of the Penal Code are necessarily included with-
in the age group covered by section 702 of the Welfare 
and Institutions Code. It is inconceivable that the acts de-
scribed in sections 261 (1) and 288 would not contribute to 
the delinquency of a minor. (See Rodriguez v. Superior 
Oourt, 27 Cal.2d 500, 502 [165 P.2d 1]; People v. Tenner, 
67 Cal.App.2d 360, 366 [154 P.2d 9] ; People v. Krupa, 64 
Cal.App.2d 592, 601 [149 P.2d 416] at 601.) Since every 
violation of sections 261 (1) and 288 is also a violation of 
section 702, the offense defined in the latter is an offense 
necessarily included in the offenses defined in sections 261 (1) 
and 288. (People v. Lopez, 46 Cal.App.2d 857, 858 [117 P.2d 
10].) ... It is true that each offense is stated differently in 
the codes and that defendant could have contributed to the 
delinquency of a minor without committing statutory rape 
or a lewd and lascivious act .... Nevertheless, the converse 
is not true. Weare holding, not that these offenses are 
identical, but that every violation of sections 261(1) and 288 
necessarily constituteg a violation of section 702 and that 
therefore the offense defined in section 702 is an offense neces-
sarily included in the offenses dE-fined in sections 261 (1) 
and 288." The conclusion is therefore inescapable that the 
) 
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rule now announced by the majority cannot be reconciled 
with our holding ill the Greer case. 
Nor is it consequential that the victim's age in the present 
case appears to be IS years and therefore beyond the age 
protected under section 261, subdivision 1. The actual age 
of the victim, as revealed by the evidence, does not control 
the determination of included offense problems. Under the 
rule stated in the Greer case, the test is whether the lesser 
offense, as a legal proposition, is included within the greater 
offense. The actual age of the victim as revealed by the 
evidence is not important for any purpose other than deter-
mining the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction 
under section 702, a matter not here involved. By charging 
forcible rape, the information implicitly but clearly incor-
porated the crime of rape by voluntary intercourse with a 
female under the statutory age aud hence put the petitioner 
on notice that the age of his victim was an issue properly 
within the case. 
The writ should be denied. 
